### Framework

#### A. Interp – the AFF must defend a USFG policy that either reduces restrictions on or provides financial incentives for energy production.

#### “Resolved” means the framework for the resolution is to enact a policy.

Words and Phrases 64

(Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is **“to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;”** It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### The USFG is the government in Washington D.C.

Encarta 0

(http://encarta.msn.com)

 **“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC”**

#### B. Violation— the AFF does not defend the literal USFG implementation of a policy

#### C. Reasons to prefer—

#### 1) Competition – without a stable resolutional advocacy, the AFF can sever all links and moot pre-round prep; competitive equity is valuable and necessary for self-growth. We must have a basis to challenge the AFF and engage in struggle.

Yovel 5

[Jonathan, Faculty of Law at University of Haifa in Israel, “Gay Science as Law: An Outline for a Nietzschean Jurisprudence,” *Nietzsche and Legal Theory: Half-Written Laws*, 2005, rehosted at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=950742>] // myost

While reactive forces respond to their context and in this way are dictated by them, active forces find their own mediums for action. There is a catch, however. **Force needs resistance in order to matter, grow, and be challenged.** In a paragraph whose importance to the understanding of Nietzsche’s “mechanics” of power can hardly be exaggerated, he spells it out**: [S]trong nature . . . needs objects of resistance;** hence it looks for what resists . . . . The strength of those who attack can be measured in a way by the opposition they require: every growth is indicated by the search for a mighty opponent . . . . **The task is not simply to master what happens to resist, but what requires us to stake all our strength, suppleness, and fighting skill**—opponents that are our equals.41 Thus the will is measured in the scope of its challenges**. But the active will is not satisfied by those challenges it happens to come by. For the challenge to be worthwhile it must be the most powerful possible,** and so the Person of Power must cultivate the will to power of those who are not**. In debate, the Person of Power will make the best of her opponent’s position, nourish it, then go after the strong points or strongest version or interpretation.** Kasparov must play Karpov, then Deep Blue. The philosophical problems most worthy of engagement—and Nietzsche spoke of problems as something a philosopher challenges to single combat—are the toughest ones. Of himself, he asserts “I only attack causes which are victorious . . . . I have never taken a step publicly that did not compromise me: that is my criterion of doing right.”42

#### 2) Creation – creativity is only possible within a system of rules. We cannot speak from nowhere, so we must locate ourselves within morality in order to grow or create.

Ramaekers 1

[Stefan, assistant professor at the Laboratory for Education and Society at KU Leuven in Belgium, “Teaching to Lie and Obey: Nietzsche on Education,” *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 35.2 (2001): 255-264] // myost

Much as one values Nietzsche for his cultural criticism and for his culturally innovative ideas, it would be a mistake to overlook the importance he attaches to obedience. Johnston argues that one cannot infer an anarchistic account of education from Nietzsche's writings because of his emphasis on obedience and discipline in the primary school.2 However, Johnston fails to give obedience its rightful place. For Nietzsche's account of morality (particularly in Beyond Good and Evil, and more specifically in the chapter `The Natural History of Morals') shows that **obedience is not just about keeping pupils in line, but means obedience to cultural and historical rules,** and as such is a moral imperative for all of humankind. The most important thing about every system of morals for Nietzsche is that it is `a long constraint', a `tyranny of arbitrary laws'.**3 For such cultural and historical phenomena as virtue, art, music, dancing, reason, spirituality, philosophy, politics and so on the creative act requires not absolute freedom or spontaneous unconstrained development but subordination to what is or at least appears to be `arbitrary'**. It entails a long bondage of the spirit. The singular fact remains . . . that **everything of the nature of freedom**, elegance, boldness, dance, and masterly certainty, which exists or has existed**, whether it be in thought itself, or in administration, or in speaking and persuading**, in art just as in conduct, **has only developed by means of the tyranny of such arbitrary law**; and in all seriousness, it is not at all improbable that precisely this is `nature' and `natural'—and not laisser-aller!4 The nature of morality inspires us to stay far from an excessive freedom and cultivates the need for restricted horizons. This narrowing of perspective is for Nietzsche a condition of life and growth.5 It is interesting to see how this is prefigured in Nietzsche's second Unfashionable Observation (On the Utility and Liability of History for Life). The cure for what he there calls `the historical sickness',6 i.e. an excess of history which attacks the shaping power of life and no longer understands how to utilise the past as a powerful source of nourishment, is (among others) the ahistorical: `the art and power to be able to forget and to enclose oneself in a limited horizon'.7 Human beings cannot live without a belief in something lasting and eternal.8 **Subordination to the rules of a system of morality should not be understood as a deplorable restriction of an individual's possibilities and creative freedom; on the contrary, it is the necessary determination and limitation of the conditions under which anything can be conceived as possible.** **Only from within a particular and arbitrary framework can freedom itself be interpreted as freedom**. In other words, Nietzsche points to the necessity of being embedded in a particular cultural and historical frame. The pervasiveness of this embeddedness can be shown in at least four aspects of Nietzsche's writings. First, in his critique of morality Nietzsche realises all too well that it is impossible to criticise a system of morals from outside, as a view from nowhere. Instead a particular concretisation is required. Beyond Good and Evil may very well, as a prelude to a philosophy of the future, excite dreams about unlooked-for horizons and unknown possibilities. In The Genealogy of Morals, however, written by Nietzsche as further elaboration and elucidation of the same themes, he explicitly states that Beyond Good and Evil does not imply going beyond good and bad.9 Criticising a system of morals inevitably means judging from a particular point of view.

#### 3) Education – we must learn to lie within systems of rules. This is necessary to function in society, where we have to work with others and obey the rules.

Ramaekers 1

[Stefan, assistant professor at the Laboratory for Education and Society at KU Leuven in Belgium, “Teaching to Lie and Obey: Nietzsche on Education,” *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 35.2 (2001): 255-264] // myost

In view of the importance Nietzsche attaches to obedience, to being embedded, one should not be surprised that he considers initiating the child into a particular constellation of arbitrary laws to be a natural part of her education. For the child, education means, at least in the early stages, being subordinated to a particular view of what is worth living for, and being introduced into a system of beliefs. Education consists in teaching the child to see and to value particular things, to handle a perspective: to lie. The argument goes even further. In view of Nietzsche's **perspectivism one must now say that not initiating the child into a perspective, not teaching him to lie is educationally speaking not even an option: the child makes himself familiar with a perspective he cannot ignore since this is the precondition for making sense of anything and exploring the unfamiliar.** Put differently**, because of the necessity of being embedded a human being is moulded into a particular shape that he cannot do without.** My understanding of Nietzsche is consequently at variance with any understanding which argues for a radical individualism and takes the individual to be the point of reference of all values and truths. Johnston35 for example tilts the scales too strongly towards the individual as a self-affirming autonomous agent and hence disregards the epistemologically and ethically constitutive importance of the individual's embeddedness for what she affirms as true and valuable. He even claims that the individual put forward by Nietzsche is the antithesis of the social realm. For Nietzsche, Johnston writes, `there is no question of a reconciliation between the realms of the individual and the social'.36 Referring to Dewey, he makes it look as if the Nietzschean individual can withdraw herself from social embeddednes since she apparently has no need to refer her own action to that of others.37 Adopting a thoroughly Nietzschean stand on education therefore requires, in Johnston's opinion, a break with education conceived as a matter of `making familiar with' and of being initiated into a particular cultural inheritance, that is as a matter of socialisation in this rich sense. In consequence education becomes essentially self-education. It is not hard to see that focusing in this manner on the individual is greatly welcomed by progressive educational movements such as child-centred pedagogies. In their critique of the traditional educational model, characterised simply as a bestowal of values by the educator, they show their concern with the child's personal identity. In this view initiating the child into a particular view of life does injustice to her personal identity, her true self is suppressed, suffocated and not given the opportunity to develop into what it `really' is**. Education should by contrast create room for the self-development of the child's true self:** this seems to be the educational lesson to be learned from Rousseau, Rogers, Steiner and Freinet among others. An emphasis on a particular kind of experiential learning, supported by a distinctive conception of the nature of experience, warrants the child giving meaning to her own life.

#### D. This is a voter for competition and education. We should fashion the rules of debate to make ourselves more excellent individuals.

Yovel 5

[Jonathan, Faculty of Law at University of Haifa in Israel, “Gay Science as Law: An Outline for a Nietzschean Jurisprudence,” *Nietzsche and Legal Theory: Half-Written Laws*, 2005, rehosted at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=950742>] // myost

**In society, the law that best serves the Person of Power is that which empowers the other to best prepare him for such “war”.**43 **Law must elevate the other’s own powers to the fullest of their potential** (the overman, of course, has no presupposed potential: a potential for her would be power-constraining rather than a horizon for development). The Person of Power will not rely on social norms to serve her in overcoming or in dominating: that is the way of ressentiment. Instead she will form law that will make the best out of that which she must stand up to, namely the others. Nietzsche is no closet-liberal: **the principle of law as empowerment of the other is strictly a mean for the will to become more, for the power to will**.44 Law does not empower the other as a subject, although through empowerment the other might discover her own power and so much the better. The other—**the person enslaved by the psychology of ressentiment, be he called slave or master—needs not be empowered to become less contemptible, yet it is because of his contemptibility that he must be elevated.** Empowerment of the other is the active will’s maxim in the exact sense in which the elevated will categorizes natural phenomenon and shapes cognition and language—namely, creating the environment for the best possibilities for the will to cast itself in the world, both natural and social.

### Cap K

#### **The affirmative’s valorization of plutonium only makes energy production easier and thus cheaper, the logic of capitalism dictates that this only increases consumption resulting in extinction of the planet**

Foster et al 2010 (John Bellamy [prof of sociology @ U of Oregon], Brett Clark [Assistant prof of sociology @ NC State U] and Richard York [assoc. prof of sociology @ U of Oregon]; Capitalism and the Curse of Energy Efficiency; Nov 1; <http://monthlyreview.org/2010/11/01/capitalism-and-the-curse-of-energy-efficiency>; kdf)

The Jevons Paradox was forgotten in the heyday of the age of petroleum during the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, but reappeared in the 1970s due to increasing concerns over resource scarcity associated with the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth analysis, heightened by the oil-energy crisis of 1973-74. As energy efficiency measures were introduced, economists became concerned with their effectiveness. This led to the resurrection, at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, of the general question posed by the Jevons Paradox, in the form of what was called the “rebound effect.” This was the fairly straightforward notion that engineering efficiency gains normally led to a decrease in the effective price of a commodity, thereby generating increased demand, so that the gains in efficiency did not produce a decrease in consumption to an equal extent. The Jevons Paradox has often been relegated to a more extreme version of the rebound effect, in which there is a backfire, or a rebound of more than 100 percent of “engineering savings,” resulting in an increase rather than decrease in the consumption of a given resource.30¶ Technological optimists have tried to argue that the rebound effect is small, and therefore environmental problems can be solved largely by technological innovation alone, with the efficiency gains translating into lower throughput of energy and materials (dematerialization). Empirical evidence of a substantial rebound effect is, however, strong. For example, technological advancements in motor vehicles, which have increased the average miles per gallon of vehicles by 30 percent in the United States since 1980, have not reduced the overall energy used by motor vehicles. Fuel consumption per vehicle stayed constant while the efficiency gains led to the augmentation, not only of the numbers of cars and trucks on the roads (and the miles driven), but also their size and “performance” (acceleration rate, cruising speed, etc.)—so that SUVs and minivans now dot U.S. highways. At the macro level, the Jevons Paradox can be seen in the fact that, even though the United States has managed to double its energy efficiency since 1975, its energy consumption has risen dramatically. Juliet Schor notes that over the last thirty-five years:¶ energy expended per dollar of GDP has been cut in half. But rather than falling, energy demand has increased, by roughly 40 percent. Moreover, demand is rising fastest in those sectors that have had the biggest efficiency gains—transport and residential energy use. Refrigerator efficiency improved by 10 percent, but the number of refrigerators in use rose by 20 percent. In aviation, fuel consumption per mile fell by more than 40 percent, but total fuel use grew by 150 percent because passenger miles rose. Vehicles are a similar story. And with soaring demand, we’ve had soaring emissions. Carbon dioxide from these two sectors has risen 40 percent, twice the rate of the larger economy.¶ Economists and environmentalists who try to measure the direct effects of efficiency on the lowering of price and the immediate rebound effect generally tend to see the rebound effect as relatively small, in the range of 10 to 30 percent in high-energy consumption areas such as home heating and cooling and cars. But once the indirect effects, apparent at the macro level, are incorporated, the Jevons Paradox remains extremely significant. It is here at the macro level that scale effects come to bear: improvements in energy efficiency can lower the effective cost of various products, propelling the overall economy and expanding overall energy use.31 Ecological economists Mario Giampietro and Kozo Mayumi argue that the Jevons Paradox can only be understood in a macro-evolutionary model, where improvements in efficiency result in changes in the matrices of the economy, such that the overall effect is to increase scale and tempo of the system as a whole.32¶ Most analyses of the Jevons Paradox remain abstract, based on isolated technological effects, and removed from the historical process. They fail to examine, as Jevons himself did, the character of industrialization. Moreover, they are still further removed from a realistic understanding of the accumulation-driven character of capitalist development. An economic system devoted to profits, accumulation, and economic expansion without end will tend to use any efficiency gains or cost reductions to expand the overall scale of production. Technological innovation will therefore be heavily geared to these same expansive ends. It is no mere coincidence that each of the epoch-making innovations (namely, the steam engine, the railroad, and the automobile) that dominated the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries were characterized by their importance in driving capital accumulation and the positive feedback they generated with respect to economic growth as a whole—so that the scale effects on the economy arising from their development necessarily overshot improvements in technological efficiency.33 Conservation in the aggregate is impossible for capitalism, however much the output/input ratio may be increased in the engineering of a given product. This is because all savings tend to spur further capital formation (provided that investment outlets are available). This is especially the case where core industrial resources—what Jevons called “central materials” or “staple products”—are concerned.¶ The Fallacy of Dematerialization¶ The Jevons Paradox is the product of a capitalist economic system that is unable to conserve on a macro scale, geared, as it is, to maximizing the throughput of energy and materials from resource tap to final waste sink. Energy savings in such a system tend to be used as a means for further development of the economic order, generating what Alfred Lotka called the “maximum energy flux,” rather than minimum energy production.34 The deemphasis on absolute (as opposed to relative) energy conservation is built into the nature and logic of capitalism as a system unreservedly devoted to the gods of production and profit. As Marx put it: “Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!”35¶ Seen in the context of a capitalist society, the Jevons Paradox therefore demonstrates the fallacy of current notions that the environmental problems facing society can be solved by purely technological means. Mainstream environmental economists often refer to “dematerialization,” or the “decoupling” of economic growth, from consumption of greater energy and resources. Growth in energy efficiency is often taken as a concrete indication that the environmental problem is being solved. Yet savings in materials and energy, in the context of a given process of production, as we have seen, are nothing new; they are part of the everyday history of capitalist development.36 Each new steam engine, as Jevons emphasized, was more efficient than the one before. “Raw materials-savings processes,” environmental sociologist Stephen Bunker noted, “are older than the Industrial Revolution, and they have been dynamic throughout the history of capitalism.” Any notion that reduction in material throughput, per unit of national income, is a new phenomenon is therefore “profoundly ahistorical.”37¶ What is neglected, then, in simplistic notions that increased energy efficiency normally leads to increased energy savings overall, is the reality of the Jevons Paradox relationship—through which energy savings are used to promote new capital formation and the proliferation of commodities, demanding ever greater resources. Rather than an anomaly, the rule that efficiency increases energy and material use is integral to the “regime of capital” itself.38 As stated in The Weight of Nations, an important empirical study of material outflows in recent decades in five industrial nations (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, and Japan): “Efficiency gains brought by technology and new management practices have been offset by [increases in] the scale of economic growth.”39¶ The result is the production of mountains upon mountains of commodities, cheapening unit costs and leading to greater squandering of material resources. Under monopoly capitalism, moreover, such commodities increasingly take the form of artificial use values, promoted by a vast marketing system and designed to instill ever more demand for commodities and the exchange values they represent—as a substitute for the fulfillment of genuine human needs. Unnecessary, wasteful goods are produced by useless toil to enhance purely economic values at the expense of the environment. Any slowdown in this process of ecological destruction, under the present system, spells economic disaster.¶ In Jevons’s eyes, the “momentous choice” raised by a continuation of business as usual was simply “between brief but true [national] greatness and longer continued mediocrity.” He opted for the former—the maximum energy flux. A century and a half later, in our much bigger, more global—but no less expansive—economy, it is no longer simply national supremacy that is at stake, but the fate of the planet itself. To be sure, there are those who maintain that we should “live high now and let the future take care of itself.” To choose this course, though, is to court planetary disaster. The only real answer for humanity (including future generations) and the earth as a whole is to alter the social relations of production, to create a system in which efficiency is no longer a curse—a higher system in which equality, human development, community, and sustainability are the explicit goals.

#### Nuclear energy is a smokescreen to continue the capitalist project of imperialism, ensure there is money to be made after oil, and the development of nuclear weapons

ICC 2011 (International Communist Current; Nuclear Energy, capitalism and communism; <http://www.dianuke.org/nuclear-energy-and-capitalism/>; kdf)

The potential to use nuclear fission or fusion to produce power has been known about for around a century but it was only after the Second World War that it was actually realised. Thus, while its general context is that outlined above, the specific context is the post-war situation dominated by the rivalry between the USA and USSR and the nuclear arms race that resulted. The development of nuclear power is thus not only inextricably linked to that of nuclear weapons but was arguably a smokescreen for the latter.¶ In the early 1950s the American government was concerned about the public’s response to the danger of the nuclear arsenal it was assembling and the strategy of first strike that was being propounded. It’s response was to organise a campaign known as Operation Candor to win the public over through adverts across the media (including comic books) and a series of speeches by President Eisenhower that culminated in the announcement at the UN General Assembly of the ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme to “encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable materials.”[19] The plan included sharing information and resources, and the US and USSR jointly creating an international stockpile of fissionable material. In the years that followed the arms race went on unabated and nuclear weapons spread to other powers, often under the guise of a civilian nuclear power programme, as in Israel and India. The initial reactors produced large quantities of material for nuclear weapons and small amounts of very expensive electricity. The sharing of nuclear knowledge became part of global imperialist struggles; thus in the late 1950s Britain secretly supplied Israel with heavy water for the reactor it was building with French assistance.[20]¶ Despite talk about energy too cheap to meter, nuclear power has never fulfilled this promise and has relied on state support to cover its real cost. Even where private companies build and run plants there are usually large open or hidden subsidies. For example privatisation of the nuclear industry in Britain failed when Thatcher attempted it in the 1980s because private capital identified there were unquantifiable costs and risks. It was only in 1996, when the ageing Magnox reactors that would soon need decommissioning were excluded from the deal that private investors were prepared to buy British Energy at a knockdown price of £2bn. Six years later the company had to be bailed out with a £10bn government loan.[21]¶ While advocates of nuclear energy today argue that it is cheaper than other sources this remains a questionable assertion. In 2005 the World Nuclear Association, stated that “In most industrialized countries today, new nuclear power plants offer the most economical way to generate base-load electricity even without consideration of the geopolitical and environmental advantages that nuclear energy confers” and published a range of data to support the claim that construction, financing, operating and waste and decommissioning costs have all reduced.[22] Between 1973 and 2008 the proportion of energy from nuclear reactors grew from 0.9% of the global total to 5.8%.[23]¶ A report published in 2009, commissioned by the German Federal Government,[24] makes a far more critical evaluation of the economics of nuclear power and questions the idea that there is a nuclear renaissance underway. The report points out that the number of reactors has fallen over the last few years in contrast to the widespread forecasts of increases in both reactors and the power produced. The increase in the amount of power generated that has taken place during this period is the result of upgrading the existing reactors and extending their operational life. It goes on to argue that there is a lot of uncertainty about the reactors currently described as being ‘under construction’, with a number having been in this position for over 20 years. The number under construction has fallen from the peak of over 200 in 1980 to below 50 in 2006.¶ As regards the economics of nuclear power, the report points to the high level of uncertainty in all areas including financing, construction, operation and decommissioning. It shows that the state remains central to all nuclear projects, regardless of who they are formally owned and operated by. One aspect of this is the various forms of subsidy provided by the state to support capital costs, waste management and plant closure and price support. Another has been the necessity for the state to limit the liability of the industry in order for the private sector to accept the risks. Thus in 1957 the US government stepped in when insurance companies refused to agree insurance because they were unable to quantify the risk.[25] Today it is estimated that “In general national limits are in the order of a few hundred million Euro, less than 10% of the cost of building a plant and far less than the cost of the Chernobyl accident.”[26]¶ The dangers of nuclear energy are as fiercely debated as the costs and the scientific evidence seems to be very variable. This is particularly the case with the Chernobyl disaster where the estimates of the deaths that resulted vary widely. A World Health Organisation Report found that 47 the 134 emergency workers initially involved had died as a result of contamination by 2004[27] and estimated that there would be just under 9,000 excess deaths from cancer as a result of the disaster.[28] A report by Russian scientists published in the Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences estimated that from the date of the accident until 2006 some 985,000 additional deaths had resulted from the accident from cancer and a range of other diseases.[29]¶ For those without specialist medical and scientific knowledge this is difficult to unravel, but what is less questionable is the massive level of secrecy and falsification that runs from the decision by the British government to withhold publication of the report into one of the first accidents in the industry at Windscale in 1957 to Fukishima today where the true scale of the disaster only emerged slowly. Returning to Chernobyl, the Russian government did not report the accident for several days, leaving the local population to continue living and working amidst the radiation. But it was not only Russia. The French government minimised the radiation levels reaching the country[30] and told its population that the radiation cloud that spread across the whole of Europe had not passed over France![31] Meanwhile the British government reassured the country that there was no risk to health, reporting levels of radiation that were forty times lower than they actually were[32], and then quarantined hundreds of farms. As late as 2007 374 farms in Britain still remained under the special control scheme.[33]¶ Nuclear energy is being pushed by various governments as a ‘green’ solution to the problems associated with fossil fuels. This is largely a smokescreen to hide the real motives, which are concerns about the possible exhaustion of oil, the increasing price of oil and the risks associated with a dependence on energy resources outside the state’s control. This green facade is slipping as the economic crisis leads states to return to coal[34] and to push down the costs of exploiting new sources of oil, much of which is physically hard to access, or requires processes that pollute and despoil the environment, such as coal-tar sands. Energy supplies have also been a factor in the imperialist struggles over recent years and it seems likely that this may increase in the period ahead. Nuclear energy then comes back to where it started as a source of fissile material and a cover for weapons programmes.

#### There is no pure pursuit of what makes us happy- pleasure gets coopted into conservative politics and makes us complicit in environmental destruction and imperialist wars

Kincheloe 07Joe Canada Research Chair of Critical Pedagogy at McGill University “Critical Pedagogy in the Twenty-First Century: Evolution for Survival,” Critical Pedagogy: Where are we now, p 30-31

Pleasure is a powerful social educator, and the pleasure produced by capital teaches a very conservative political lesson: since corporations produce pleasure, we should align our interests with them. In this way our "affect11 is organized in the service of capital: lower corporate taxes, better business climates, equation of the corporate bottom line with social well- being, larger executive salaries, lower labor costs, fewer environmental regulations, and support for imperial wars, to name just a few. Hegemony in this new context operates where affect and politics intersect: the cultural realm. The revolutionary feature of this repressive, capital-driven ideological education is that culture shapes the political. Critical pedagogues have sometimes failed to appreciate this circumstance, not to mention its dramatic impact on the shaping of political consciousness and subjectivity.

#### Affect's multiplicity creates the ideal conditions for capital to open new markets.

**Massumi, 2002** (Brian – Department of Communication Sciences @ Universite de Montreal, “Navigating Movements”)

It is very clear that capitalism has undergone a major reconfiguration since the Second World War, and it’s been very difficult to think through what that has been. For me the most useful way of thinking about it comes from the post-Autonomia Italian Marxist movement, in particular the thought of Antonio Negri. The argument is that capitalist powers have pretty much abandoned control in the sense of ‘power over’. That corresponds to the first flush of ‘disciplinary’ power in Michel Foucault’s vocabulary. Disciplinary power starts by enclosing bodies in top-down institutions — prisons, asylums, hospitals, schools, and so on. It encloses in order to find ways of producing more regularity in behaviour. Its aim is to manufacture normality — good, healthy citizens. As top-down disciplinary power takes hold and spreads, it finds ways of doing the same thing without the enclosure. Prisons spawn halfway houses, hospitals spawn community clinics and home-care, educational institutions spawn the self-help and career retooling industries. It starts operating in an open field. After a certain point it starts paying more attention to the relays between the points in that field, the transitions between institutions, than to the institutions themselves. It’s seeped into the in-between. At this point it starts to act directly on the kinds of interference and resonation effects I was just mentioning. It starts working directly on bodies’ movements and momentum, producing momentums, the more varied and even erratic, the better. Normalcy starts to lose its hold. The regularities start to loosen. This loosening of normalcy is part of capitalism’s dynamic. It’s not a simple liberation. It’s capitalism’s own form of power. It’s no longer disciplinary institutional power that defines everything, it’s capitalism’s power to produce variety — because markets get saturated. Produce variety and you produce a niche market. The oddest of affective tendencies are OK — as long as they pay. Capitalism starts intensifying or diversifying affect, but only in order to extract surplus-value. It hijacks affect in order to intensify profit potential. It literally valorises affect. The capitalist logic of surplus value production starts to take over the relational field that is also the domain of political ecology, the ethical field of resistance to identity and predictable paths. It’s very troubling and confusing, because it seems to me that there’s been a certain kind of convergence between the dynamic of capitalist power and the dynamic of resistance.

#### Capitalism’s naturalization of the process of subjugation creates social exclusion on a global scale – the ultimate ethico-political responsibility is to challenge the foundations of this system’s organization principles. This makes reaching the Universal impossible.

Zizek and Daly 2004(Slavoj and Glyn, Conversations with Zizek, 14-6)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gord¬ian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today's global capitalism and its obscene naturalization/anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties con¬cerning 'multiculturalist' etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called 'radically incorrect' in the sense that it breaks with these types of positions' and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today's social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety.

For far too long, Marxism has been bedevilled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political mor¬bidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffe, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary

This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek's point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx's central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose 'universalism' fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world's population. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral marketplace.

Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded 'life-chances' cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameess (viz. the patronizing reference to the 'developing world'). And Zizek's point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism's profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle.

Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-par¬ticular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek's universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or to reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a 'glitch' in an otherwise sound matrix.

#### Their inevitability claims are both false and deny ethics—orientation towards powerful forces like death or technology are critical to the meaning of life

Cheshire 5

[William P. Cheshire, M.D. “Is human cloning inevitable? A Christian response.” *The Center for Bioethics and Culture Network*. 2005. <<http://www.thecbc.org/redesigned/research_display.php?id=46>>. // myost]

Secondly, beneath this language of inevitability lies the dogma of technological fatalism, which maintains that, if a conceivable technology (e.g. cloning) is scientifically possible, then we should allow it, because in time it will be developed anyway. Despite its grandiosity, technological fatalism is nothing more than blind determinism masquerading as ethics. It presents what at first seems to be a choice, then overrides all choices with assertions of unalterable destiny. Fatalism abandons ethics, replacing human decision with an autonomous technology which exists as an end in itself and which treats human beings as a means to achieve that ruthless end. Not to choose is also a choice. To follow the path of inevitability wherever it may lead is to reject ethics and responsibility. Bowing to technological fatalism is no escape from the guilt of becoming morally complicit with its projects. It would be better to make informed and morally praiseworthy choices about biotechnologies.

#### Thus the Alternative: Vote negative to do nothing.

#### Doing nothing is not just sitting and waiting for the moment to attack—it is the only genuine political act—it is an act of abstaining from the depoliticized gameboard of capitalism by refusing to play their game—ultimately withdrawing past the point of commodification

Zizek 2008(Slavoj, [Senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana], Violence: Big Ideas// small books. Picador, pg(s) 213-7, kdf)

Last but not least**, the lesson of the intricate rela­tionship between subjective and systemic violence is that violence is not a direct property of some acts, but is distributed between acts and their contexts, between activity and inactivity.** The same act can count as vio­lent or non-violent, depending on its context; **some­times a polite smile can be more violent than a brutal outburst.** A brief reference to quantum physics might be of some help here; one of the most unsettling no­tions in quantum physics is that of the Higgs field. Left to their own devices in an environment to which they can pass their energy, all physical systems will eventu­ally assume a state of lowest energy. To put it in another way, the more mass we take from a system, the more we lower its energy, till we reach the vacuum state at which the energy is zero. There are, however, phenomena which compel us to posit the hypothesis that there has to be something (some substance) that *we cannot take away from a given system without RAISING that sys­tem's energy—this* "something" is called the Higgs field: once this field appears in a vessel that has been pumped empty and whose temperature has been lowered as much as possible, its energy will be further lowered*.* The "something" which thus appears is a something that contains less energy than nothing. In short, sometimes **zero is not the "cheapest" state of a system, so that, paradoxically, "nothing" costs more than "something**." In a crude analogy, **the social "nothing"** (the stasis of a system, its mere reproduction without any changes**)"costs more than something"** (a change**), that is, it de­mands a lot of energy, so that the first gesture to pro­voke a change in the system is to withdraw activity, to do nothing**.¶ Jose Saramago's novel Seeing(the literal translation of the original title is *An Essay on Lucidity)3* can effec­tively be perceived as a mental experiment in Bartlebian politics.4 It tells the story of the strange events in the unnamed capital city of an unidentified democratic country. When the election day morning is marred by torrential rain, voter turnout is disturbingly low, but the weather breaks by mid-afternoon and the population heads en masse to their voting stations. **The govern­ment's relief is short lived, however, when vote counting reveals that over 7o per cent of the ballots cast in the capital have been left blank. Baffled by this apparent civic lapse, the government gives the citizenry a chance to make amends just one week later with another elec­tion day. The results are worse: now 83 per cent of the ballots are blank.** The two major political parties-the ruling party of the right (p.o.t.r.) and their chief adver­sary, the party of the middle (p.o.t.m.)-are in a panic, while the haplessly marginalised party of the left (p.o.t.l.) produces an analysis claiming that the blank ballots are essentially a vote for their progressive agenda.¶ **Is this an organised conspiracy to overthrow not just the ruling government but the entire democratic sys­tem? If so, who is behind it, and how did they manage to organise hundreds of thousands of people into such subversion without being noticed? When asked how they voted, ordinary citizens simply respond that such information is private, and besides, is not leaving the ballot blank their right**? Unsure how to respond to a benign protest but certain that an anti-democratic con­spiracy exists, the government quickly labels the move­ment "terrorism, pure and unadulterated" and declares a state of emergency, allowing the government to sus­pend all constitutional guarantees. Five hundred citizens are seized at random and dis­appear into secret interrogation sites, and their status is coded red for secrecy. Their families are informed in Orwellian style not to worry about the lack of informa­tion concerning their loved ones, since "in that very si­lence lay the key that could guarantee their personal safety." When these moves bear no fruit, the right-wing government adopts a series of increasingly drastic steps, from declaring a state of siege and concocting plots to create disorder to withdrawing the police and seat of government from the capital, sealing all the city's en­trances and exits, and finally manufacturing its own terrorist ringleader. The city continues to function near-normally throughout, the people parrying each of the government's thrusts in inexplicable unison and with a truly Gandhian level of non-violent resistance. In his perspicacious review of the novel, Michael Wood noted a Brechtian parallel:In a famous poem, written in East Germany in 1953, Brecht quotes a contemporary as saying that the people have lost the trust of the government. Would it not therefore be easier, Brecht slyly asks, to dissolve the people and have the government elect another one? Saramago's novel is a parable of what happens when neither government nor people can be dissolved. While the parallel holds, the concluding characterisa­tion seems to fall short: the unsettling message of *See­ing is* not so much the indissolubility of both people and government as the compulsive nature of democratic rit­uals of freedom. What happens is that by abstaining from voting, people effectively dissolve the government-not only in the limited sense of overthrowing the existing government, but more radically. Why is the government thrown into such a panic by the voters' abstention? It is compelled to confront the fact that it exists, that it ex­erts power, only insofar as it is accepted as such by its subjects- accepted even in the mode of rejection. The voters' abstention goes further than the intra-political negation, the vote of no confidence: it rejects the very frame of decision. In psychoanalytic terms, **the voters' abstention is something like the** psychotic *Verwerfung* **(foreclosure, rejection/repudiation), which is a more radical move than repression** *(Verdrangung).* According to Freud, **the repressed is intellectually accepted by the subject, since it is named, and at the same time is negated because the subject refuses to recognise it, refuses to rec­ognise him or herself in it. In contrast to this, foreclo­sure rejects the term from the symbolic *tout court.******To* circumscribe the contours of this radical rejection, one is tempted to evoke Badiou's provocative thesis: "It is better to do nothing than to contribute to the invention of formal ways of rendering visible that which Empire already recognizes as existent.' Better to do nothing than to engage in localised acts the ultimate function of which is to make the system run more smoothly** (acts such as providing space for the multitude of new subectivities). **The threat today is not passivity, but pseudo-activity, the urge to "be active' to "participate," to mask the nothingness of what goes on. People intervene all the time, "do something"; academics participate in meaningless debates,** and so on. **The truly difficult thing is to step back, to withdraw. Those in power often prefer even a "critical" participation, a dialogue, to silence-just to engage us in "dialogue," to make sure our ominous passivity is broken. The voters' abstention is thus a true political *act:* it forcefully confronts us with the vacuity of today's democracies.**

### Case

#### Plutonium is far from harmless – its processing requires the creation of deadly nuclear waste

UCS 11

[Union of Concerned Scientists, “Nuclear Reprocessing: Dangerous, Dirty, and Expensive,” 5 April 2011, <http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_power/nuclear_power_risk/nuclear_proliferation_and_terrorism/nuclear-reprocessing.html>] // myost

Reprocessing is a series of chemical operations that separates plutonium and uranium from other nuclear waste contained in the used (or “spent”) fuel from nuclear power reactors. The separated plutonium can be used to fuel reactors, but also to make nuclear weapons. In the late 1970’s, the United States decided on nuclear non-proliferation grounds not to reprocess spent fuel from U.S. power reactors, but instead to directly dispose of it in a deep underground geologic repository where it would remain isolated from the environment for at least tens of thousands of years. While some supporters of a U.S. reprocessing program believe it would help solve the nuclear waste problem, reprocessing would not reduce the need for storage and disposal of radioactive waste**.** Worse, reprocessing would make it easier for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons materials, and for nations to develop nuclear weapons programs. Reprocessing would increase the risk of nuclear terrorism. Less than 20 pounds of plutonium is needed to make a simple nuclear weapon. If the plutonium remains bound in large, heavy, and highly radioactive spent fuel assemblies (the current U.S. practice), it is nearly impossible to steal. In contrast, separated plutonium is not highly radioactive and is stored in a concentrated powder form. Some claim that new reprocessing technologies that would leave the plutonium blended with other elements, such as neptunium, would result in a mixture that would be too radioactive to steal. This is incorrect; neither neptunium nor the other elements under consideration are radioactive enough to preclude theft. Most of these other elements are also weapon-usable. Moreover, commercial-scale reprocessing facilities handle so much of this material that it has proven impossible to keep track of it accurately in a timely manner, making it feasible that the theft of enough plutonium to build several bombs could go undetected for years. A U.S. reprocessing program would add to the worldwide stockpile of separated and vulnerable civil plutonium that sits in storage today, which totaled roughly 250 metric tons as of the end of 2009—enough for some 30,000 nuclear weapons. Reprocessing the U.S. spent fuel generated to date would increase this by more than 500 metric tons. Reprocessing would increase the ease of nuclear proliferation. U.S. reprocessing would undermine the U.S. goal of halting the spread of fuel cycle technologies that are permitted under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but can be used to make nuclear weapons materials. The United States cannot credibly persuade other countries to forgo a technology it has newly embraced for its own use. Although some reprocessing advocates claim that new reprocessing technologies under development will be "proliferation resistant," they would actually be more difficult for international inspectors to safeguard because it would be harder to make precise measurements of the weapon-usable materials during and after processing. Moreover, all reprocessing technologies are far more proliferation-prone than direct disposal. Reprocessing would hurt U.S. nuclear waste management efforts. First, there is no spent fuel storage crisis that warrants such a drastic change in course. Hardened interim storage of spent fuel in dry casks is an economically viable and secure option for at least fifty years. Second, reprocessing does not reduce the need for storage and disposal of radioactive waste, and a geologic repository would still be required. Plutonium constitutes only about one percent of the spent fuel from U.S. reactors. After reprocessing, the remaining material will be in several different waste forms, and the total volume of nuclear waste will have been increased by a factor of twenty or more, including low-level waste and plutonium-contaminated waste. The largest component of the remaining material is uranium, which is also a waste product because it is contaminated and undesirable for reuse in reactors. Even if the uranium is classified as low-level waste, new low-level nuclear waste facilities would have to be built to dispose of it. And to make a significant reduction in the amount of high-level nuclear waste that would require disposal, the used fuel would need to be reprocessed and reused many times with an extremely high degree of efficiency—an extremely difficult endeavor that would likely take centuries to accomplish. Finally, reprocessing would divert focus and resources from a U.S. geologic disposal program and hurt—not help—the U.S. nuclear waste management effort. The licensing requirements for the reprocessing, fuel fabrication, and waste processing plants would dwarf those needed to license a repository, and provide additional targets for public opposition. What is most needed today is a renewed focus on secure interim storage of spent fuel and on gaining the scientific and technical consensus needed to site a geological repository.